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mcphub/plugins/wordpress/handlers/_media_security.py
airano-ir f203ca88de
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feat(v3.12.0): media pipeline, AI image generation, capability probe, companion v2.9.0
Three-month batch sync from internal repo (~80 commits) covering Tracks F.5a, F.7e, F.8, F.17, F.18, F.X.

WordPress media pipeline
- Pillow-based optimization, AI image generation (OpenAI / Stability / Replicate / Google Nano Banana / OpenRouter), chunked + resumable uploads, bulk delete/reassign, idempotent retries.

Capability discovery (F.7e)
- Per-site credential probe + adapters for WordPress / WooCommerce / Gitea, tier-fit unions granted ∪ roles, capability badge UI with HTMX partial re-check, install hint in every companion-unreachable error.

Companion plugin overhaul
- Renamed wordpress-plugin/airano-mcp-seo-bridge → wordpress-plugin/airano-mcp-bridge.
- Eight new endpoints: /capabilities, /bulk-meta, /export, /cache-purge, /transient-flush, /site-health, /audit-hook, /upload-and-attach.
- wp.org Plugin Check pass: i18n, WP_Filesystem, scheme allowlist on audit-hook URL.

Other
- Gitea ergonomics (F.17): batch files, tree, search, compare, releases, fork.
- Opportunistic bcrypt upgrade for legacy SHA-256 admin keys (F.8).
- n8n refactor: structured errors, capability probe, missing tools backfilled.
- Idempotency-Key dedup for AI media upload retries; WP client fast-fails on unreachable sites.

Docs
- README + CLAUDE.md drop the fixed "633 tools" claim. The total grows with each release; per-plugin approximations + dashboard-surfaced counts replace it.
- Tools/Tests badges removed in favour of "Plugins: 10".

Deployment
- PyPI mirror chain, optional BUILD_HTTP_PROXY, Alpine→Yandex apk mirror, Debian-slim Plan-B Dockerfile, mirror.gcr.io variant.

CI
- Black + Ruff clean on Python 3.12; pytest tests/ green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-25 16:25:58 +02:00

241 lines
7.2 KiB
Python

"""Media upload security primitives: MIME sniff, size validation, SSRF guard, filename safety."""
from __future__ import annotations
import ipaddress
import mimetypes
import os
import re
import socket
from collections.abc import Iterable
from dataclasses import dataclass
from urllib.parse import urlparse
try:
import magic as _magic # type: ignore
except Exception:
_magic = None
class UploadError(Exception):
"""Structured upload error with stable code for JSON responses."""
def __init__(self, code: str, message: str, details: dict | None = None):
super().__init__(message)
self.code = code
self.message = message
self.details = details or {}
def to_dict(self) -> dict:
return {"error_code": self.code, "message": self.message, "details": self.details}
DEFAULT_MAX_BYTES = int(os.environ.get("WP_MEDIA_MAX_MB", "10")) * 1024 * 1024
ALLOWED_MIMES: set[str] = {
"image/jpeg",
"image/png",
"image/webp",
"image/gif",
"image/avif",
"image/heic",
"image/bmp",
"image/tiff",
"application/pdf",
"video/mp4",
"video/webm",
"video/quicktime",
"audio/mpeg",
"audio/mp4",
"audio/webm",
"audio/ogg",
"audio/wav",
}
_EXT_MAP = {
"image/jpeg": ".jpg",
"image/png": ".png",
"image/webp": ".webp",
"image/gif": ".gif",
"image/avif": ".avif",
"image/heic": ".heic",
"application/pdf": ".pdf",
"video/mp4": ".mp4",
"video/webm": ".webm",
"video/quicktime": ".mov",
"audio/mpeg": ".mp3",
"audio/mp4": ".m4a",
"audio/ogg": ".ogg",
"audio/wav": ".wav",
}
def _builtin_sniff(data: bytes) -> str | None:
"""Minimal magic-byte sniffer for common media types (libmagic-free fallback)."""
if not data:
return None
if data.startswith(b"\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\n"):
return "image/png"
if data.startswith(b"\xff\xd8\xff"):
return "image/jpeg"
if data[:4] == b"GIF8":
return "image/gif"
if data.startswith(b"%PDF-"):
return "application/pdf"
if data[:4] == b"RIFF" and data[8:12] == b"WEBP":
return "image/webp"
if data[:4] == b"RIFF" and data[8:12] == b"WAVE":
return "audio/wav"
if data[4:12] in (b"ftypmp42", b"ftypisom", b"ftypMSNV", b"ftypavc1"):
return "video/mp4"
if data[4:8] == b"ftyp":
# Generic ISO BMFF — likely mp4/heic
brand = data[8:12]
if brand in (b"heic", b"heix", b"mif1"):
return "image/heic"
return "video/mp4"
if data.startswith(b"\x1aE\xdf\xa3"):
return "video/webm"
if data.startswith(b"ID3") or data[:2] == b"\xff\xfb":
return "audio/mpeg"
if data.startswith(b"OggS"):
return "audio/ogg"
return None
def sniff_mime(data: bytes, *, hint: str | None = None) -> str:
"""Detect MIME from magic bytes. Uses libmagic if available, else built-in sniff."""
if _magic is not None:
try:
detected = _magic.from_buffer(data[:4096], mime=True)
if detected and detected != "application/octet-stream":
return detected
except Exception:
pass
built_in = _builtin_sniff(data)
if built_in:
return built_in
if hint and "/" in hint:
return hint.lower()
return "application/octet-stream"
def validate_size(data: bytes, *, max_bytes: int = DEFAULT_MAX_BYTES) -> None:
if len(data) == 0:
raise UploadError("EMPTY_FILE", "Upload data is empty.")
if len(data) > max_bytes:
raise UploadError(
"TOO_LARGE",
f"File is {len(data)} bytes; limit is {max_bytes} bytes "
f"(~{max_bytes // 1024 // 1024} MB). Use chunked upload for larger files.",
{"size": len(data), "max": max_bytes},
)
def validate_mime(mime: str, *, allowed: Iterable[str] = ALLOWED_MIMES) -> None:
if mime not in allowed:
raise UploadError(
"MIME_REJECTED",
f"MIME type '{mime}' is not allowed. " f"Supported: {', '.join(sorted(allowed))}.",
{"mime": mime},
)
_FILENAME_SAFE_RE = re.compile(r"[^A-Za-z0-9._-]+")
def safe_filename(filename: str | None, *, mime: str) -> tuple[str, str | None]:
"""Return (ascii_filename, rfc5987_encoded_original_if_non_ascii)."""
original = (filename or "").strip() or "upload"
# Strip any path components
original = original.rsplit("/", 1)[-1].rsplit("\\", 1)[-1]
try:
original.encode("ascii")
ascii_name = _FILENAME_SAFE_RE.sub("_", original)
encoded = None
except UnicodeEncodeError:
from urllib.parse import quote
ascii_name = _FILENAME_SAFE_RE.sub(
"_", original.encode("ascii", "ignore").decode() or "upload"
)
encoded = "UTF-8''" + quote(original, safe="")
# Ensure extension matches MIME
ext = _EXT_MAP.get(mime) or (mimetypes.guess_extension(mime) or "")
if ext and not ascii_name.lower().endswith(ext):
base = ascii_name.rsplit(".", 1)[0] if "." in ascii_name else ascii_name
ascii_name = f"{base}{ext}"
return ascii_name[:255], encoded
def content_disposition(filename_ascii: str, filename_encoded: str | None) -> str:
"""Build Content-Disposition header, optionally with RFC 5987 filename* for non-ASCII."""
base = f'attachment; filename="{filename_ascii}"'
if filename_encoded:
return f"{base}; filename*={filename_encoded}"
return base
# --- SSRF guard ------------------------------------------------------------
_BLOCKED_HOSTS = {
"metadata.google.internal",
"metadata",
"169.254.169.254",
}
@dataclass
class SSRFCheck:
allowed: bool
reason: str | None = None
resolved_ip: str | None = None
def ssrf_check(url: str, *, allow_http: bool = False) -> SSRFCheck:
"""Reject URLs pointing to private/loopback/link-local/metadata endpoints."""
try:
parsed = urlparse(url)
except Exception as e:
return SSRFCheck(False, f"URL parse failed: {e}")
if parsed.scheme not in ("http", "https"):
return SSRFCheck(False, f"Scheme '{parsed.scheme}' not allowed; use https (or http).")
if parsed.scheme == "http" and not allow_http:
return SSRFCheck(False, "HTTP URLs are disabled; use HTTPS.")
host = (parsed.hostname or "").lower()
if not host:
return SSRFCheck(False, "URL has no host.")
if host in _BLOCKED_HOSTS:
return SSRFCheck(False, f"Host '{host}' is on the SSRF blocklist.")
# Resolve and check each IP
try:
infos = socket.getaddrinfo(host, None)
except socket.gaierror as e:
return SSRFCheck(False, f"DNS resolution failed: {e}")
seen: list[str] = []
for info in infos:
ip_str = info[4][0]
seen.append(ip_str)
try:
ip = ipaddress.ip_address(ip_str)
except ValueError:
return SSRFCheck(False, f"Unparseable IP '{ip_str}'.")
if (
ip.is_private
or ip.is_loopback
or ip.is_link_local
or ip.is_reserved
or ip.is_multicast
or ip.is_unspecified
):
return SSRFCheck(False, f"Host resolves to disallowed IP {ip}.", ip_str)
return SSRFCheck(True, None, seen[0] if seen else None)